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DOES IT REALLY MATTER?
CONSERVATIVE COURTS IN A CONSERVATIVE ERA

Gerald Rosenberg’s influential The Hollow Hope? Can Courts Bring About Social
Reform sharply distinguished between the constrained and dynamic view of judicial power. The
constrained view, a version of which is held by most political scientists and a few prominent law
professors, insists that litigation is a poor means for bringing about progressive social reform.
Proponents insist that judges rarely disagree with elected officials and have little capacity to
implement those decrees that do diverge from electoral preferences. Courts, they claim, “can do
little more than point out how actions have fallen short of constitutional or legislative
requirements and hope that appropriate action is taken.”1 The dynamic view, favored by most
law professors and some political scientists, regards courts as more effective promoters of
progressive political change. Proponents of judicial capacity believe that Americans enjoy “the
world’s most powerful court system,” one that “protect[s] minorities and defend[s] liberty, in the
face of opposition from the democratically elected branches.”2 To the despair of many liberals,3
Rosenberg’s study concluded that American practice provided more support for constrained
1

Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?

(University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1991), p. 3.
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Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope, p. 2.
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See Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (Yale University Press:

New Haven, 1996), pp. 3-4.
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courts. “[A]ttempts to use the courts to produce significant social reform,” he insisted, were
“mostly disappointing.”4 Such judicial decisions as Brown v. Board of Education5 and Roe v.
Wade6 had little impact on political policy and may have even weakened the political movements
necessary to secure integrated education and widely available legal abortion.7
Findings that outraged many legal liberals during the early 1990s8 may provide
progressives in law schools with some solace during the decades to come. Three years after The
Hollow Hope was published, the Rehnquist Court began striking down federal laws at
unprecedented rates.9 Conservative judicial majorities found new First Amendment,10 Tenth
Amendment,11 commerce clause12 and state sovereignty13 limitations on federal power.
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See Gerald N. Rosenberg, “Hollow Hopes and Other Aspirations: A Reply to Feeley
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See Thomas M. Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court in History: The Road to

Modern Judicial Conservatism (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2004), p. 40.
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See i.e., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) Colorado Republican

Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996), United States v. United Foods, 533
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Congressional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was sharply curtained.14
The same conservative majorities imposed constitutional limits on state power to adopt
affirmative action policies,15 forbid invidious discrimination,16 increase the political power of
formerly disenfranchised minorities,17 regulate land use,18 prohibit religious proselyting in public
schools,19 limit commercial advertizing,20 and restrict campaign finance.21 The most
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conservative justices on their Rehnquist Court, Justice Clarence Thomas in particular,
consistently urged the conservative majority to increase their conservative activism.22 Thomas’s
opinions and recent scholarship produced by a new generation of conservative constitutional
thinkers23 call on the Supreme Court to expand these existing conservative constitutional
precedents,24 and find new constitutional limitations on government power grounded in the
second amendment,25 the public use clause of the fifth amendment,26 the necessary and proper

22

See, i.e., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, ___, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2230-37 (2005)

(Thomas, J., dissenting); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727 n.2 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 486-87 (2001)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Kelo v. City of New London, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2677-87
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also, Mark A. Graber, “Clarence Thomas,” Biographical
Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court: The Lives and Legal Philosophies of the Justices (edited by
Melvin I. Urofsky) (CQ Press: Washington, D.C., 2006), pp. 548-52.
23

See especially, Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of
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clause of Article I27 and the spending clause of Article I.28 The two most recent judicial
appointees, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, seem sympathetic with these
judicial and intellectual trends.29 Assuming liberals are unlikely to gain the electoral victories
necessary to move the Roberts Court to the left over time,30 the best progressive hope may be
that conservative courts have no more capacity to promote conservative social change than
Rosenberg insisted liberal courts have to promote liberal social change.
This essay explores the likelihood that conservative federal courts in the near future will
be agents of conservative social change. The following pages assess whether conservative
justices on some issues will support more conservative policies than conservative elected
officials are presently willing to enact and whether such judicial decisions will influence public
policy. This paper touches only tangentially on three other important questions concerning
judicial capacity in a conservative age. The first is the continued vitality of litigation as a
27

See Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, pp. 158-89.

28

See, i.e., Lynn A. Baker, “Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez,” 95 Columbia

Law Review 1911 (1995).
29

See See Seth Rosenthal, “Fair to Meddling: The Myth of the Hands-Off Conservative

Jurist,” Slate, June 27, 2006; Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); United States v. Rybar, 103
F.3d 273, 286 (3rd Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
30

See L.A. Powe, Jr., “The Not-So-Brave New Constitutional Order,” 117 Harvard Law

Review 647, 680-85 (2003); Mark A. Graber, “Rethinking Equal Protection in Dark Times,” 4
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 314, 342-45 (2002).
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strategy for achieving liberal social change, or at least maintaining liberal precedents, at a time
when the federal courts have largely been packed with movement conservatives. The second is
the probability that conservatives on the federal bench will sustain and legitimate conservative
federal and state policies that a more liberal court might declare unconstitutional. The third is
whether future conservative litigation campaigns will promote conservative policies, regardless
of any legal success, by mobilizing activists and helping forge conservative political identities.31
My focus is strictly on whether the Roberts Court is likely to bring about conservative social
changes that conservatives cannot bring about by relying primarily on other governing
institutions and political strategies.
Gerald Rosenberg’s pathbreaking analysis of judicial power to produce social reform
indicates that conservative litigation campaigns must overcome three constraints to be politically
efficacious. The first constraint is “the limited nature of constitutional rights.” “[N]ot all social
reform goals,” Rosenberg maintains, “can be plausibly presented in the name of constitutional
rights.”32 Conservative courts will be poor vehicles for realizing pro-life policies (as opposed to
merely overruling Roe) if conservative justices who think abortion is immoral nevertheless
31

For claims that liberal litigation campaigns have had this impact, see Michael W.

McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilization (Univerity
of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1994). See also Thomas M. Keck, “From Bakke to Grutter: The Rise
of Rights-Based Conservatism,” The Supreme Court & American Political Development (edited
by Ronald Kahn and Ken I. Kersch) (University of Kansas Press: Lawrence, Kansas, 2006), pp.
422-25.
32

Rosenberg, Hollow Hope, pp. 10, 11.
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conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect unborn children. The second
constraint is “the lack of judicial independence.” Rosenberg observes that “Supreme Court
decisions . . . seldom stray[] far what [is] previously acceptable” in large part because
“Presidents . . . tend to nominate judges who they think will represent their judicial
philosophies.”33 Conservative courts will be poor vehicles for downsizing the federal
government if those conservative elected officials who bestow substantial governmental largess
on conservative constituencies are able to secure judicial majorities that find such conservative
pork constitutional. The third constraint is “the judiciary’s inability to develop appropriate
policies and its lack of powers of implementation.” The Hollow Hope points out that “[l]acking
powerful tools to force implementation, court decisions are often rendered useless given much
opposition.”34 Conservative courts will be poor vehicles for realizing a color-blind society if
liberal universities find effective means for masking or otherwise immunizing from
constitutional attack affirmative action policies previously voided by conservative judicial
majorities.
These constraints on conservative judicial policy making matter even when conservatives
control the elected branches of the national government and most state governments.
Conservative litigation campaigns are effective during times of conservative political ascendancy
only when litigation secures more conservative policies than can be achieved through electoral
politics. If conservative elected officials pass a national ban on abortion, conservatives, at least
in the short run, will not need an activist judicial decision declaring that legal abortion violates
33

Rosenberg, Hollow Hope, pp. 10, 13.

34

Rosenberg, Hollow Hope, pp. 10, 21.
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the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the unborn. At most, conservatives will require
conservative courts to declare such laws pass constitutional muster under the Fourteenth
Amendment or, perhaps, the commerce clause. Pro-life litigation will make a pro-life policy
difference only when conservative courts declare existing pro-choice policies unconstitutional
and those decisions are implemented by officials who had previously been unwilling to repeal
the offending socially liberal laws.
Part I of this essay explores the extent to which conservative policy demands can be
translated into plausible conservative legal arguments. Rosenberg found that progressive
litigators were often, although not always, able to overcome this constraint on judicial power.
The same seems true for conservatives. Important differences exist between contemporary
conservative political agendas and the main lines of conservative legal argument. Conservatives
who lose political battles over the military budget are unlikely to have such defeats reversed by
courts, given the broad consensus that the appropriate level of military spending is not a judicial
question. Nevertheless, such prominent scholars as Richard Epstein and Randy Barnett are
developing a conservative/libertarian constitutional vision likely to appeal to many conservative
justices who share their policy preferences.35 Conservative justices interested in handing down
conservative judicial decisions on matters from gun regulation to home schooling for religious
children will not lack for plausible constitutional arguments.
Part II considers the likelihood that conservative judicial majorities will be more
35

See, i.e., See Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent

Domain (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985); Barnett, Restoring the
Lost Constitution.
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conservative than conservative electoral majorities. Rosenberg believed the judicial recruitment
process was a significant constraint on progressive litigation campaigns, given powerful
evidence that elected officials are able to secure federal justices who share their policy
preferences. Nevertheless, while the appointment process practically guarantees that
conservative justices nominated and confirmed by conservative elected officials will not advance
constitutional visions outside the conservative mainstream, the balance of power among
conservatives on the court may differ from the balance of power among conservatives in the
elected branches of the national government. Executive control over judicial nominations is
likely to yield a conservative judiciary that sides with conservative presidents against
conservative legislators on questions concerning the separation of powers. Conservative justices
who are far more affluent and educated than the average Republican are likely to side with
conservative elites against conservative populists when disagreements exist within the
conservative majority on such matters as deregulation and torture during the war on terrorism.
Part III assesses the extent to which activist conservative decisions will influence public
policy. Rosenberg found that activist progressive decisions were often ignored by less
progressive governing officials. Some evidence suggests that activist conservative decisions in
several areas of constitutional law are suffering a similar fate. Universities have maintained and
adopted hate speech policies that have consistently been declared unconstitutional by federal
justices. Hostile judicial decisions have influenced, but hardly halted, race conscious programs
in government contracting and university admissions. The conservative attack on regulation, by
comparison, has been more successful. Studies suggest that judicial activism in takings clause
cases is inhibiting both unconstitutional and constitutional land use and environmental
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regulations. The constitutional rules conservative courts hand down, preliminary analysis
suggests, matter less as legal standards that dictate particular results than as rhetorical resources
that influence the willingness and ability of governing institutions to pay the litigation costs
necessary to maintain more liberal policies.
The overall picture suggests that conservative courts in the foreseeable future are likely to
promote a drift toward libertarianism. Conservative constitutional commentators have had more
success popularizing constitutional arguments for striking down liberal governmental programs
than constitutional arguments for mandating conservative governmental programs. The
conservative case for limiting eminent domain is far more developed and diffused among
conservative lawyers than the conservative case for granting Fourteenth Amendment rights to
unborn children. The affluent and well educated conservatives likely to sit on the federal bench
are economically more conservative than the average Republican voter, but no more socially
conservative. Such justices are far more likely to go on a crusade against burdensome
environmental regulations than issue jeremiads against communities that adopt same-sex
marriage. The evidence at present suggests that elected officials are more likely to comply with
judicial decisions limiting government regulatory power than judicial decisions requiring the
restructuring of liberal institutions. The slightest hint of litigation often dissuades localities from
enforcing land use regulations, but those same officials often devise ingenious means for evading
judicial decisions barring most affirmative action programs. The forces accelerating judicial
libertarianism provide some cause for optimism among progressives committed to privacy rights,
who are likely to fare no worse in courts than in legislatures, and may fare a bit better in the
former. Progressives who believe that “the vigor of government is essential to the security of
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liberty,”36 however, are likely to find the Roberts Court to be an additional irritant while
Republicans rule, and a major obstacle to liberal reform should the political left establish a better
balance of political power in the electoral branches of government.
I. The Limited Nature of Constitutional Rights

Conservative courts engage in conservative judicial activism only when conservative
judicial majorities conclude that a conservative policy is judicially enforceable. This truism
contains two potential constraints on courts as conservative policymakers. First, conservative
justices must conclude that a particular conservative policy choice is constitutionally mandated,
that governing officials may not select a more liberal alternative. Judicial proponents of capital
punishment will not engage in conservative activism if they believe that elected officials may
constitutionally, although unwisely, punish murder by life imprisonment or less. Second,
conservative justices must conclude that a conservative policy choice mandated by the
constitution is judicially enforceable. James Bradley Thayer’s influential essay in the 1893
Harvard Law Review insisted that justices should sustain any government action a reasonable
person might think constitutional.37 Conservative proponents of judicial restraint who are
36

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (New

American Library: New York, 1961), p. 35. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights:
FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need it More than Ever (Basic Books: New York,
2004).
37
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Law,” 7 Harvard Law Review 129 (1893).
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committed to this logic will refrain from striking down affirmative action programs they believe
are based on a mistaken, but plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
These constraints have not inhibited prominent conservative justices and scholars from
championing conservative judicial activism in numerous areas of constitutional law.
Conservative majorities on the Rehnquist Court frequently declared federal and state laws
unconstitutional.38 Justice Scalia’s separate opinions asserted that the justices were required to
strike down various liberal policies that Rehnquist Court majorities sustained.39 Justice Thomas
would have the Supreme Court overrule the major constitutional decisions underlying the New
Deal.40 Established and younger conservative scholars are publishing influential essays and
books defending the activist directions charted by Justices Thomas and Scalia,41 and providing
constitutional justifications for conservative activism in other areas of constitutional law.42
38

See notes ___ above, and the relevant text.

39

See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 554-65 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Adarand

Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring).
40

See sources cited in note ___, above.

41

See John O. McGinnis, “Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s

Journey of Social Discovery,” 90 California Law Review 485 (2002); J. Harvie Wilkinson III,
“Is There a Distinctive Conservative Jurisprudence?” 73 University of Colorado Law Review
1383 (2002).
42

See especially, Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution; Douglas H. Ginsburg, “On

Constitutionalism,” 2 Cato Supreme Court Review 7, 15-17 (2003); Bernard H. Siegan,
Economic Liberties and the Constitution (second edition) (Transaction Publishers: New
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These conservative legal writings, on and off the bench, have developed plausible
constitutional arguments for striking down numerous liberal policies. They include claims that:
1. Various gun control regulations violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendment.43
2. Most, if not all, restrictions on campaign contributions and expenditures violate the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.44
3. Restrictions on hate speech violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as do antidiscrimination laws when applied to much hate speech in employment settings.45
4. Restrictions on non-misleading commercial advertising violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.46
5. Racial, gender, and ethnic preferences are unconstitutional,47 except in prisons and
similar institutions.48

Brunswick, New Jersey, 2006).
43

See Eugene Volokh, “The Commonplace Second Amendment,” 73 New York

University Law Review 793 (1998).
44

See Bradley A. Smith, Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform

(Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 2003).
45

See David E. Bernstein, You Can’t Say That: The Growing Threat to Civil Liberties

from Anti-Discrimination Law (Cato Institute: Washington, D.C., 2003).
46

See Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, “Whose Afraid of Commercial Speech?” 76

Virginia Law Review 627 (1990).
47

See Adarand, at 240-41 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

48

Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 524-50 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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6. The First and Fourteenth Amendments forbid government officials from discriminating
against religious groups when administering government programs. Religious groups
have a constitutional right to meet on public properties open to secular organizations.49
Religious believers have the right to compete for government funds on an equal basis
with other persons, even when those funds will be used to pursue religious goals.50
7. The free exercise clause vests religious believers with the right to opt out of various
government programs and be exempt from neutral government regulations, unless there is
a compelling reason to require adherence.51 Public schooling, by promoting secularism,
may be unconstitutional.52
8. Many governmental regulations, land use and environment regulations in particular,
violate the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment and the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.53
49

See Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 553 U.S. 98 (2001).

50

See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726-34 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Eugene

Volokh, “Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies,” 58 Stanford Law
Review 1919, 1928-29 (2006)
51

See Michael W. McConnell, “Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,” 57

University of Chicago Law Review 1109 (1990).
52

See Richard F. Duncan, “Public Schools and the Inevitability of Religious Inequality,”

1996 Brigham Young University Law Review 569 (1996).
53

See Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain

(Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985).
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9. The public use clause of the Fifth Amendment forbids government from condemning
property under eminent domain and then transferring title to a different private owner,
even when government pays just compensation and doing so might promote economic
development or other constitutional ends.54
10. Minimum wage laws, maximum hour laws, and perhaps even laws forbidding
discrimination by private businesses violate the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.55
11. Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment may only remedy constitutional
violations identified by the Supreme Court.56
12. Legal abortion violates the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the unborn.57
54

Kelo v. City of New London, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2679-81 (2005) (Thomas,

J., dissenting); Eric R. Claeys, “Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights,” 2004
Michigan State Law Review 877 (2004).
55

See Bernard H. Siegan, Economic Liberties and the Constitution (University of

Chicago Press: Chicago, Illinois, 1980), pp. 110-21, 318-31; Douglas Ginsburg, Delegation
Running Riot, 18 Regulation 83, 84 (1995); Richard Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case
Against Employment Discrimination Laws (Harvard University Press: Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1992).
56

See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 558-560 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

57

See David W. Louisell and John T. Noonan, Jr., “Constitutional Balance,” The

Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical perspectives (edited by John T. Noonan, Jr.,)
(Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970), pp. 244-58; James J. Lynch, Jr.,
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13. Vague legislative delegations to administrative agencies are inconsistent with the
separation of powers mandated by the constitution.58
14. The spending power in Article I, Section 8 is limited to money spent to further other
enumerated constitutional powers. Any conditions on the receipt of federal funds must be
directly connected to the purpose of the spending.59
15. The commerce clause permits Congress to regulate only activities that direct affect
interstate commerce transactions, not manufacturing, employee/employer relationships,
and noncommercial matters.60
16. The necessary and proper clause mandates that federal regulations must have a plain
and direct connection to an enumerated constitutional power.61
Conservative jurists who endorse these constitutional claims are not inhibited by any
theory of the judicial function that compels judicial restraint in the face of perceived

“Posterity: A Constitutional Peg for the Unborn,” 40 American Journal of Jurisprudence 401,
403-04 (1995).
58

Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 486-87 (2001)

(Thomas, J., concurring); Ginsburg, “On Constitutionalism,” p. 16-17.
59

See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 727 n.2 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); Baker,

“Conditional Federal Spending.”
60

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-601 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting);

Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, pp. 274-318.
61

See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, ___, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2231-34 (2005) (Thomas, J.,

dissenting); Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, pp. 158-89.
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unconstitutional government action. The conservative generation that called on liberal justices to
exercise judicial restraint62 is rapidly being replaced by a younger generation of scholars who are
as eager to employ judicial power on behalf of conservative causes as the previous generation of
liberals were to employ judicial power on behalf of liberal causes.63 No proponent of Thayer’s
rule of clear constitution mistake now sits on the Supreme Court.64 The leading academic
proponents of limited judicial power are either liberal law professors65 or conservative political
scientists who have little influence on conservative judicial practice.66 Justices Thomas and
62

See, i.e., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the

Law (Simon & Schuster Inc.: New York, 1990); Lino A. Graglia, “Constitutional Mysticism:
The Aspirational Defense of Judicial Review,” 98 Harvard Law Review 1331 (1985).
63

See, i.e., Ernest A. Young, “Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics,” 73

University of Colorado Law Review 1139 (2002); Saikrishna B. Prakash and John C. Yoo,
“The Constitutional Origins of Judicial Review: Questions for Critics of Judicial Review,” 72
George Washington Law Review 354 (2003).
64

See Keck, Most Activist Supreme Court, p. 200.

65

See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial

Review (Oxford University Press: New York, 2004); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution
Away From the Courts (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1999), pp. 134-35.
66

See Matthew J. Franck, Against the Imperial Judiciary: The Supreme Court vs. the

Sovereignty of the People (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, Kansas, 1996); Keith E.
Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial
Review (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, Kansas, 1999).
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Scalia may employ the traditional rhetoric of judicial restraint when condemning exercises of
liberal judicial activism,67 but they do not hesitate to use judicial power to promote many
conservative causes.68
The legal constraint on conservative judicial activism, however, is more powerful than a
glance at recent law reviews suggest. Conservative constitutional agendas are far narrower than
conservative policy agendas. Tocqueville may have asserted that “scarcely any political
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial
question,"69 but a review of recent Republican party platforms reveals numerous political issues
that are not likely to be resolved into constitutional or judicial issues for the foreseeable future.70
The conservative constitutional agenda has little to say about foreign policy, other than a
commitment to executive power71 that will advance conservative causes only when the national
67

See, i.e., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 599, 602-05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting);

Lawrence, at 605-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68

See footnotes ___, above. See also, Mark A. Graber, “Clarence Thomas and the Perils

of Amateur History,” Rehnquist Justice: Understanding the Court Dynamic (edited by Earl
Maltz) (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, Kansas, 2003).
69

Alexus de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Vol. I) (edited by Phillips Bradley)

(Vintage Books: New York, 1945), p. 280.
70

See Mark A. Graber, “Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions:

Tocwueville’s Thesis Revisited,” 21 Constitutional Commentary 485 (2004).
71

See John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs

after 9/11 (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2005).
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executive is more conservative than the national legislature. Conservative courts presently lack
the rhetorical materials for fashioning constitutional arguments mandating that the United States
maintain existing troop strength in Iraq or promote a reduction in tariffs throughout the world.
To the extent conservatives are unable to obtain their major economic initiatives through
legislation, there is little on their constitutional agenda suggesting that a litigation campaign
might convert political losses into judicial victories. Should President Bush be unable to
convince Congress that additional tax cuts are necessary or that subsidies for the energy industry
should be increased, no extant strain of conservative constitutional thought provides grounds that
can be invoked to support a judicial decision proclaiming that such policies are constitutionally
mandated.
Law constrains many conservative justices even when academically respectable
arguments support judicial activism on behalf of a conservative cause. Conservatives dispute the
merits of various manifestations of conservative judicial activism. John Noonan defends judicial
activism on behalf of the unborn,72 but not on behalf of state sovereignty.73 Justice Scalia seems
content to challenge federal powers assumed during the Great Society, while Justice Thomas
wishes to overturn the judicial underpinnings for the New Deal.74 Hardly any prominent
conservative has signed on to Richard Epstein’s claim that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is
72

John Thomas Noonan, A Private Choice: Abortion in America in the Seventies (Free

Press: New York, 1979).
73

John T. Noonan, Jr., Narrowing the Nation’s Power: The Supreme Court Sides with the

States (University of California Press: Berkeley, California, 2002).
74

Graber, “Clarence Thomas,” pp. 542, 549.
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unconstitutional.75 While some of these disputes among conservative lawyers reflect different
policy preferences, many are rooted in law. Most conservatives oppose minimum wage laws as
economically inefficient. Prominent conservative scholars have made constitutionally
reasonable arguments that the Court in Lochner v. New York76 correctly held that maximum
hour laws were constitutionally suspect.77 Nevertheless, the vast majority of conservative
justices and scholars still maintain that Lochner was a gross abuse of the judicial power. Justice
Scalia, commonly identified with the Chicago School of law and economics,78 recently referred
to the “discredited substantive-due-process case of Lochner v. New York.”79 The number of
conservatives who insist that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided is far greater than the number
who insist that legal abortion violates the constitutional rights of the unborn. Scalia spoke for the
majority of conservative jurists when he declared that the “States may, if they wish, permit
abortion on demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so.”80
Litigation campaigns may enable conservatives to overcome some of these legal
75

Richard Epstein, Forbidden Grounds.

76

198 U.S. 45 (2005).

77

See sources cited in note___, above.

78

See Eric W. Orts, “Simple Rules and the Perils of Reductionist Legal Thought,” 75

Boston University Law Review 1441, 1442 (1995).
79

College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaidpostsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 690

80

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring and

(1999).

dissenting).
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constraints on conservative judicial activism. Conservative judicial activism on behalf of some
conservative causes will provide legal foundations for conservative judicial activism on behalf of
other causes. Just as Griswold v. Connecticut81 paved the road to Roe v. Wade, so decisions
narrowing the scope of the commerce power may provide crucial precedents for judicial
decisions narrowing the scope of the spending power.82 Litigation campaigns succeed, in part,
by over time providing politically sympathetic justices with stronger legal grounds for reaching a
desired conclusion.83 This accumulation of precedent would hardly be necessary, however, if
law did not constrain constitutional decisionmakers. Just as justices motivated only by policy
preferences would have mandated that all states adopt minimum wage laws when overruling
Lochner, so crude judicial behaviorialists are seemingly committed to predicting that a judicial
decision overruling Roe will mandate that all states ban abortion.
Conservative legal victories may foster increased conservative policy commitments.
Some conservative judicial decisions will fashion political environments conducive to a more
conservative citizenry. Just as judicial decisions sustaining affirmative action were partly
responsible for numerous businesses learning that a racially balanced work force often improves
profits,84 so judicial decisions sustaining policies that stigmatize abortion may increase popular
81
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support for pro-life policies. The causation arrow between law and policy preferences runs in
both directions.
Scholars studying the Roberts Court are likely to witness how law both constrains and
facilitates judicial activism. Contrary to Tocqueville and the attitudinal model of judicial
decisionmaking,85 justices do not automatically translate their policy preferences into judicial
enforceable constitutional mandates. No prominent conservative jurist presently thinks that the
Supreme Court should declare unconstitutional legislation increasing funding for stem cell
research. Most conservative opponents of legal abortion insist that the constitution permits, but
does not require, states to prohibit reproductive choice. Nevertheless, increased conservative
judicial activism is likely to influence both conservative policy preferences and conservative
constitutional understandings. Roberts Court decisions limiting governmental regulatory power
and restricting legal abortion may create precedents sufficient to convince conservative citizens
opposed to minimum wages and legal abortion that such policies are also unconstitutional. Such
decisions will also help shape a regime that tends to produce citizens who believe that minimum
wages and legal abortion are undesirable public policies. Indeed, during a sustained period of
conservative ascendancy in all branches of the national government, conservative political and
legal successes are likely to puss constitutional politics far to the right of their present ideological
location. The political and legal decisions that entrenched the New Deal provided crucial
political and legal underpinnings for Great Society programs and Warren Court decisions that
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were almost inconceivable in 1932. The political and legal decisions that entrench Reagan/Bush
conservatism may similarly provide crucial political and legal underpinnings for conservative
policies and constitutional decisions that are presently, at most, mere cocktail conversation at
Heritage Foundation and Federalist Society meetings.

II. Judicial Support

Conservative justices engage in conservative judicial activism only when they support
more conservative policies than conservative elected officials are willing to make. Rosenberg
found that this constraint significantly weakened liberal litigation campaigns. Justices who were
aware that, at best, weak political support existed for integration and reproductive choice, were
unwilling to insist on measures mandating immediate desegregation or requiring public hospitals
to terminate pregnancies, policies that would have significantly increased racial balance in public
schools and access to legal abortion.86 Some evidence suggests that Rehnquist Court majorities
were no more willing aggressively champion conservative policies that threatened prominent
conservative constituencies. Faced with opposition from big business and libertarian
suburbanites, the justices refused to insist on a color-blind constitution87 and overrule Roe v.
Wade.88 Nevertheless, good reasons exist for thinking that on many issues, particular those of
86
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concern to conservative elites, the Roberts Court may act more consistently on certain
conservative principles than conservative elected majorities.
Conservative litigators aiming for broad social impact must convince conservative
justices to make policies that are not being made by the conservatives who control the elected
branches of the national government. American constitutional politics, however, is structured in
ways that apparently privilege judicial restraint rather than judicial activism. If “the vast
majority of federal jurists have been affiliated with a partisan group and . . . have shared the
party affiliation of the president who nominated them,” and these “justices . . . bring their politics
into the courtroom,”89 then conservative justices are far more likely to sustain conservative
policies than insist on policies more conservative than elected officials are willing to make.
When conservative majorities in the elected branches of the national government act on the same
narrow view of federal power as is shared by conservative majorities in the national judiciary,
the national government does not pass new laws or enforce existing laws in ways the justices
think unconstitutional.90 Conservative judicial activism, in this political universe, seems likely to
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be limited to striking down liberal state policies in blue state outliers.91
Other enduring features of American constitutional politics increase the probability that
justices selected by a relatively enduring conservative coalition will frequently be willing to act
when those elected officials are not. Elected officials, various political science studies
demonstrate, frequently promote judicial power to resolve difficult policy issues.92 Pushing
politically divisive issues to the federal judiciary enables political leaders to overcome
91
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weaknesses in their partisan coalitions, avoid making decisions on matters that crosscut existing
partisan cleavages, and engage in credit claiming. Keith Whittington observes how “(p)olitical
majorities may effectively delegate a range of tasks to a judicial agent that the courts may be able
to perform more effectively or reliably than the elected officials can acting directly.”93
Rehnquist Court decisions limiting the scope of national power under the Fourteenth
Amendment enabled Republican legislative officials to express publicly sympathy for rape
victims, religious minorities and the disabled,94 while minimizing Republican political
accountability for the judicial decisions declaring those legislative efforts unconstitutional.95 The
judicial selection process, while practically guaranteeing that only conservatives will be
appointed to the Roberts Court, also practically guarantees that those conservatives will tend to
favor the presidential wing of the Republican party and conservative elites whenever disputes
arise that divide conservative presidents and conservative legislators or conservative elites and
conservative populists.
The prospects for conservative judicial activism in a conservative era are as obscured as
enlightened by constant repetition of Robert Dahl’s famous observation that “it would appear, on
93
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political grounds, somewhat unrealistic to suppose that a Court whose members are recruited in
the fashion of Supreme Court Justices would long hold to norms of Right or Justice substantially
at odds with the rest of the political elite.”96 Dahl understood that conservative elected officials
were unlikely to appoint and confirm justices who would side with liberals on those issues that
divided conservatives from liberals. Even when one party controls all elected branches of the
national government, however, the political elite is unlikely to be a monolith. "[J]udicial
conservatism," Eric Claeys correctly observes, “is not a coherent single project of constitutional
interpretation.”97 Libertarians offer constitutional visions that differ substantially from those
championed by evangelic Christians. Both frequently advance claims hostile to the
constitutional concerns of big business. The internal divisions within contemporary
conservativism and the Republican party explain why some members of the present political elite
support enthusiastically, others merely tolerate, and still others vigorously oppose conservative
litigation campaigns for second amendment rights, religious exemptions from anti-discrimination
rules, fewer government restrictions on campaign finance restriction, greater respect for private
property rights, and an end to affirmative action.98 The prospects for conservative judicial
96
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activism on these and other issues depends on whether the balance of power among various
conservatives in the elected branches of the national government mirrors or slightly differs from
the balance of power among conservatives in the national judiciary.
Random selection may explain some judicial activism in conservative and other ages.
Nine members of the governing majority selected at random are unlikely to mirror the governing
majority perfectly, particular governing majorities as diverse as American governing
majorities.99 The arbitrariness associated with small groups provides reasons for thinking much
judicial review will be “noise around zero,” offering “essentially random changes, sometimes
good and sometimes bad, to what the political system produces.”100 During the 1920s, the
99
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judicial majority was somewhat more conservative than the national majority. During the 1950s
and 1960s, the judicial majority was somewhat more liberal than the national majority. The
Rehnquist Court was somewhat more conservative than the national majority on some issues and
somewhat more liberal than the national majority on others.101 These deviations, a statistical
analysis might suggest, are the normal outcome of a very small sample.
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Random judicial review offers some hope for conservative and liberal litigators alike.
Given the present conservative coalition consists of libertarians, proponents of certain big
businesses, suburbanites who like low taxes, westerners opposed to land restrictions, religious
conservatives and proponents of the war in Iraq, a very high probability exists that by sheer
statistical accident, some members of the Republican coalition will be overrepresented in the
Supreme Court and others will be underrepresented. To the extent religious conservatives are
overrepresented, religious conservative litigators may be able to obtain exemptions from antidiscrimination laws that conservative electoral majorities will unwilling to adopt. To the extent
proponents of big business wind up overrepresented on the Supreme Court, federal environmental
regulations and prohibitions on commercial advertizing might be declared unconstitutional. The
downside for (some) conservative litigators is that random fluctuations are as likely to benefit
liberals as conservatives. If, for example, big business conservatives are overrepresented in the
federal judiciary, then conservative courts may prove quite supportive of affirmative action
programs favored by the Chamber of Commerce.102 To the extent libertarians are overrepresented
on a conservative judiciary, proponents of gay rights are likely to have some litigation
successes.103
Conservative courts may also make conservative policies that conservative elected
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officials privately prefer but for political reasons would rather not publicly endorse.104
Conservatives in Congress have the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to ban
affirmative action. They may prefer, however, that judicial majorities take the political heat for
such a decision. Representatives under great political pressure to pass campaign finance
regulations they believe either unconstitutional or likely to favor political rivals may resolve their
dilemmas by favoring legislation and supporting judicial nominees highly likely to declare such
regulations unconstitutional. Similar efforts to have one’s cake and eat it may explain why many
conservatives supported the Gun Free Schools Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the
Violence Against Women Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, all the while praising and
supporting the federal justices who declared unconstitutional crucial provisions of these
measures.105 Such symbolic politics, however, may also promote liberal policymaking.
Conservative lawmakers who vote for statutes banning flag-burning or obscenity have also
supported judicial nominees who are strong first amendment libertarians.106 Some prominent
commentators think Republicans are quietly quite happy that the Supreme Court presently
protects a modicum of abortion and gay rights, thus allowing suburbanites to vote their
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conservative economic values rather than their liberal social values.107
Presidential influence on the judicial selection process provides another reason why
conservative judicial majorities may prove more conservative than conservative law-making
majorities. Supreme Court justices are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate.
Presidents typically select justices whom they believe will provide strong support for their
political program.108 Senators usually confirm all presidential nominees they believe reasonably
qualified and not ideologically extreme.109 Many Senators support judicial nominees whose
views they perceive to be quite extreme when the nominating president is a member of their
party.110 Members of the House of Representatives have almost no say in the process by which
the federal bench is staffed. Not surprisingly, therefore, Supreme Court justices have historically
favored constitutional visions championed by the presidential wing of the dominant national
coalition when that vision differs from that of the legislative wing of the dominant national
coalition.111 The Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations were able to staff
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the federal courts with racial liberals at a time when they were not able to convince the
Democratic Congress to pass major civil rights legislation. The resulting Warren Court did not
mirror the dominant national coalition, but was fairly representative of those persons who served
in the Justice Department during the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy
administrations.112
This presidential influence suggests the Roberts Court will be more conservative than the
present Republican Congress. The Bush Administration favors more conservative policies than
the national legislature. When, for the past six years, the executive and the legislative branch of
the national government have disagreed, the president has typically taken the more conservative
position.113 Separation of powers concerns have become particularly acute when President Bush
signs bills into law. The Bush administration has issued more than 750 signing statements
asserting that some provision in legislation passed by Republican majorities in both houses of
Congress is unconstitutional. In virtually every instance, President Bush has indicated that he will
not enforce measures more liberal than his administration believes appropriate. The objectionable
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provisions include:
bills banning the use of U.S. troops in combat against rebels in Columbia, bills
requiring reports to Congress when money from regular appropriations is diverted
to secret operations; two bills forbidding the use in military intelligence of
materials “not lawfully collected” in violation of the Fourth Amendment; a postAbu Ghraib bill mandating new regulations for military prisons in which military
lawyers were permitted to advise commanders on the legality of certain kinds of
treatment even if the Department of Justice lawyers did not agree; bills requiring
the retraining of prison guards in humane treatment under the Geneva
Conventions, requiring background checks for civilian contractors in Iraq and
banning contractors from performing security, law enforcement, intelligence and
criminal justice functions.114
Other signing statements declare that the president will not comply with legislative demands that
scientific findings be presented to Congress uncensored and “refuse[] to honor Congressional
attempts to impose affirmative action or diversity requirements on federal hiring.”115 To the
extent President Bush successfully secures a Supreme Court that mirrors his conservative
constitutional vision rather than that of the Congress, the judicial majority is likely to declare
unconstitutional many laws that his administration will not enforce. Such justices are also likely
to support presidential prerogative not to enforce measures the president regards as
unconstitutional.
The tendency for federal courts to be staffed by legal elites provides a final reason why
conservatives on some issues might be more successful in court than in electoral politics.
Virtually all contemporary Supreme Court justices have attended a very prestigious law school
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and either practiced with an elite law firm or taught at an elite law school.116 These informal
qualifications for judicial service mean that conservatives on the bench are likely to be far more
educated and wealthier than the average conservative or Republican voter. Numerous surveys
suggest that highly educated, affluent conservatives politically differ from their less educated,
poorer peers. For most of the late twentieth century, such persons were likely to be more
economically conservative and more socially liberal than other conservatives.117 These
differences between elite and mass opinion help explain why, in both the United States and in
other countries, justices during the late twentieth century tended to promote both economic and
sexual liberty.118
Pew Research Center surveys of the American political landscape reveal changing
differences between more affluent, better education Republicans and their less fortunate peers that
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may help predict the future direction of the Roberts Court.119 Researchers found that core
Republican voters can be divided into three groups, Enterprisers, Social Conservatives and ProGovernment Conservatives. Voters in two other groups, Upbeats and Disaffecteds, also vote
overwhelming for Republican candidates. Enterprisers differ from every other group of voter in
two respects. They are much better educated and far more affluent on average. Their high socioeconomic status makes Enterprisers far more likely than Social Conservatives, Pro-Government
Conservatives, or any other group of voters to secure federal judiciary appointments. Second,
Enterprisers are far more committed to limited government and Bush administration policies
during the war against terror than any other group of voters. Substantially higher percentages of
Enterprises than Conservatives or Pro-Government Conservatives favor privatizing social
security, drilling for oil in the Alaska Wilderness, reducing domestic spending, increasing military
spending, torturing suspected terrorists, retaining the Patriot Act, maintaining recent tax cuts,
eliminating minimum wages, banning affirmative action, and foregoing national health insurance.
Enterprisers, however, are no more inclined that other core Republicans to support such socially
conservative policies as banning abortion. Upbeats, the other group of affluent, highly educated,
Republican voters, are far more likely than other Republicans to favor legal abortion and gay
marriage. A judiciary composed of affluent, highly educated Republican elites, these findings
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indicate, will be far more conservative economically than the average Republican, more
supportive of Bush administration foreign policies than the average Republican, but no more and
perhaps even less supportive of social conservatism than the average Republican. Such a
judiciary can be expected to take a narrower view than the national legislature of federal power
under the commerce and spending clauses, but be no more tempted than any other governing
institution to see aggressively to have Roe v. Wade or Lawrence v. Texas overruled.120
Social conservatives hoping for some judicial activism on behalf of their causes may be
heartened by political science research on elite polarization.121 Recent surveys are finding that
“political party elites in the United States have grown increasingly polarized along a single
ideological dimension.” Party elites now tend to take more extreme positions than average
citizens on “social welfare, racial, and cultural issues.”122 One consequence of this elite
polarization is that all governing official, legislators, executives and justices, in a conservative era
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are likely to be more conservative than the average voter, even the average Republican voter.123
Prominent Republicans are presently far more likely than the average Republican voter to prefer
limited government, oppose affirmative action, and favor bans on abortion.124 Given the political
risks inherent in pushing programs more extreme than their constituents prefer, Republican
elected officials more conservative than their average constituent have electoral incentives to foist
responsibility for pursuing the conservative revolution on to the federal courts. Jacob Hacker and
Paul Pierson note how Republicans prefer to “Run from Daylight,” when making policies more
conservative than the constituents favor. This political strategy entails finding “alternative
routes” that typically “throw up fewer roadblocks and attract less attention” than legislation,
making such practices “especially attractive for moving public policy off center.”125 On matters
as diverse as weakening environmental regulations, banning affirmative action, and ensuring that
religious believers are exempt from anti-discrimination laws, conservatives in the elected branch
of government may prefer that the “dirty work” be done by conservatives in the federal judiciary.
Rather than pass legislation securing these ends, Republicans may prefer staffing the bench with
persons who share their more extreme conservative views but who, not having to seek reelection,
are politically freer to make policies more conservative than warranted by public opinion.126
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III. Implementation

Conservative litigation movements promote conservative causes in a conservative age
only when non-judicial officials who are unwilling on their own initiative to enact or implement
certain conservative policies will nevertheless implement those policies in response to judicial
decisions. As Rosenberg demonstrated with respect to liberal constitutional causes, gaining
favorable judicial decisions is merely half the political battle, if that. Southern conservatives
maintained segregated schools long after Brown.127 Police offices on the beat, with the help of
sympathetic local judges, frequently ignored Supreme Court rulings protecting the Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights of persons suspected of crimes.128 Preliminary observations and
anecdotes, while providing some cause for thinking conservative judicial decisions may help
facilitate more libertarian environmental and regulatory policies, also suggest that many of the
same factors that made liberal courts weak vehicles for reforming conservative institutions when
elected officials were unwilling to act are making conservative courts weak vehicles for reforming
liberal institutions when elected officials are unwilling to act.
Jon B. Gould’s analysis of hate speech regulations on college campuses provides a
particular note of caution for conservative litigators bent on changing practices in a largely liberal
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academy. Conservative litigators are undefeated in court. Whenever a court has ruled on the
constitutionality of a college speech code, the policy has been declared unconstitutional.129 The
Supreme Court’s decision in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, declaring unconstitutional a city ordinance that
prohibited “plac[ing] on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization
or graffiti, . . . which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender”130 was widely
understood as aimed at campus speech codes.131 These legal successes, however, have had very
limited practical impact. Gould’s investigation revealed that most colleges retained existing hate
speech restrictions after nearly identical policies were declared unconstitutional. Far more
universities adopted than abandoned bans on racist expression, even when those policies failed to
survive judicial scrutiny in other jurisdictions. “[F]ive years after the Supreme Court spoke on
hate speech regulation,” Speak No Evil: The Triumph of Hate Speech Regulation documents,

129

See Dambrot v. Central Michigan University 55 f.3rd 1177 (6th Cir. 1995); Bair v.

Shippensburg University, 280 F. Supp. 357 (M.D. Pa. 2003); The UWM Post v. Board of Regents
of the University of Wisconsin System 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. University of
Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Corry v. Stanford University, No. 740309 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1995).
130

R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992).

131

See, i.e., Nadine Strossen, “In Defense of Freedom and Equality: The American Civil

Liberties Union Past, Present, and Future,” 29 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law
Review 143, 158 (1994).

42

“almost half of American colleges and universities had hate speech policies on their books, a rise
of nearly 30 percent from the time of the Court’s opinion.”132 The few universities that
abandoned speech codes did so in response to public pressure, not judicial rulings. Gould found
that when institutions rescinded hate speech regulations, desires to conform to judicial “holdings
were not part of their calculus.” “Their decisions reflected a cost-benefit calculation,” he
observes, “with the costs of internal strife and negative press attention outweighing any benefits
that administrators may have anticipated in the quality of campus life or the expectations for
racial, gender, or ethnic relations at the school.”133 Significantly, those institutions that have
complied with judicial decisions are “only a handful.” Gould concludes, “(a) much greater
number ignored, evaded, or directly challenged the courts’ authority.”134
Affirmative action is a second area in which conservative judicial victories have not
automatically been translated into conservative policy gains. The Supreme Court in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson135 ruled that affirmative action programs had to satisfy strict scrutiny, a
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standard that at the time was thought to be “strict in theory, fatal in fact.”136 Lower courts
faithfully followed this standard. Conservative litigators who challenged minority set-aside
programs in the wake of Croson almost always succeeded in having those policies declared
unconstitutional by federal judges.137 Nevertheless, affirmative action remained vibrant. Local
governments refused to reopen previous settlements requiring racial preferences, even after the
Supreme Court indicated that such decrees would be struck down.138 Local officials committed to
race conscious measures found means for crafting “policies that deviate[d] from the judiciary’s
policy preferences [in Croson] while simultaneously insulating those programs from litigation.”139
Martin Sweet found that “at least 150 local governments enacted, or at least attempted to enact,
revised or adopted entirely new affirmative action programs in the decade following Croson.”140
Claims that “elected officials” have “treat[ed] Court decisions as little more than ‘waste
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paper,’”141 may be too strong. A few jurisdictions abandoned affirmative action programs in
response to court decisions and other programs were scaled down.142 Still, few conservatives
would point to judicial decisions striking down affirmative action plans when celebrating judicial
capacity to promote conservative constitutional change.143
Liberal jurisdictions responded to Croson primarily by obtaining disparity reports
demonstrating that past discrimination had influenced the local market for government
construction contracts.144 Sweet notes that after 1989, more than one hundred local governments
procured disparity studies at costs between $500,000 and $7,000,000.145 Many studies are
“designed to be briefs for MBE [Minority Business Enterprise] programs and to function as
insurance policies designed to discourage litigation.”146 These studies did not directly challenge
the holding in Croson. Justice O’Connor in Croson asserted that better statistical evidence
demonstrating that “nonminority contractors were systematically excluding minority businesses
from subcontracting opportunities” would under certain circumstances justify “some form of
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narrowly tailored racial preference.”147 Nevertheless, disparity studies were not simply good faith
efforts to satisfy conservative judicial demands. For both legitimate reasons owing to the nature
of past discrimination and illegitimate reasons owing to the desire to maintain an unconstitutional
minority set-aside, localities took steps to ensure that the relevant disparity study reached the
politically correct conclusion.148 Litigants challenging minority set-asides ostensibly grounded in
a disparity study either had to engage in equally expensive studies to demonstrate error, or at least
hire experts at expensive fees who would testify against the disparity study. George R. La Noue
notes how even a faulty disparity study would typically “cheer the MBE program supporters,
intimidate the program's opponents, create some useful headlines, satisfy editorial writers, and
perhaps most importantly, add immeasurably to the plaintiff's costs in litigation.”149
Sweet’s study of minority contracting programs in Philadelphia, Portland and Miami
highlighted other ways in which localities limited the immediate and long term impact of Croson.
Philadelphia was able to maintain an unconstitutional minority business enterprise program for
many years by engaging in protracted litigation that city attorneys were fairly confident would be
unsuccessful. When, long after Croson, the city’s minority set-aside program was finally declared
unconstitutional, the mayor responded with a nominally race-neutral spending program that was
thought to have a similar impact on minority contracting with the city.150 Rather than respond to
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the colorblind demands of the conservative justices who decided Croson, Portland developed a
new minority business enterprise program that responded to the quite different financial demands
of the main conservative interest group that was sponsoring constitutional attacks on minority setasides in other cities. Portland’s new program retained racial set-asides for some municipal
contracts, but excluded from that program the larger construction contracts routinely bid on by
established firms.151 Without financing help from these larger construction companies, smaller
majority owned construction firms had no capacity to challenge what was clearly an
unconstitutional program by conservative judicial standards. Miami similarly forestalled
litigation in part by limiting implementation of a minority set aside to the contracts typically given
to small companies that lack the resources necessary for a lengthy law suit against the city.152
Dade County “complied” with court orders striking down minority set asides in construction by
maintaining a “Black, Women and Hispanic Business Enterprise” program for all county
contracts other than construction and establishing a “Community Small Business Enterprise” for
allocating construction contracts.153 Minority contractors in Miami are also likely to benefit from
proposals to convert minority business enterprise programs into geographically based business
enterprise programs that provide special breaks for contractors who live in particular areas. Given
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the level of residential segregation in Miami, a program based on geography is not likely to differ
from a program based on race.154
A similar phenomenon is occurring with other affirmative action programs, although
evidence is frequently anecdotal. Girardeau Spann notes how institutions committed to
progressive understandings of racial justice for the foreseeable future will likely be able “to secure
at least some of the benefits of racial balance” by “us(ing) race-neutral factors as proxies for
race.”155 Substituting geography for race is proving popular. Even prominent Republicans hail as
constitutional alternatives to affirmative action programs which guarantee university admissions
to any student who finishes in the top ten percent of their class.156 The constitutional problem
with such policies is that existing precedent requires strict scrutiny both for race conscious
measures and for race neutral measures that were adopted for the purpose of benefitting or
disadvantaging a particular race,157 and such programs are openly defended as means for
increasing racial balance in state universities.158 Still, as Spann points out, conservative justices
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who “delve that deeply into the intent of executive or legislative policy-makers” responsible for
race-neutral measures that benefit persons of color, “would be analytically required to delve just
as deeply into the intent lying beneath all of the facially neutral classifications that American
culture presently uses to disadvantage racial minorities with respect to education, employment,
housing, and political power.”159 Another popular move is to substitute diversity for race, making
race one element of diversity. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent in Grutter v.
Bollinger,160 diversity programs at major universities seem to function similarly to quota
systems.161 The Court’s willingness to discount the relevant evidence suggests that “Grutter . . .
can be used to support the proposition that well camouflaged racial balancing is constitutionally
permissible.”162
Future conservative litigation campaigns aimed at realizing a color-blind society are
unlikely to produce more conservative policy changes in the absence of greater conservative
commitment to race neutral practices. Present constitutional doctrine contains many loopholes in
part because important conservative constituencies, such as the Chamber of Commerce and the
military, favor some forms of race preference. As Business Week has declared, support for
affirmative action is “deeply ingrained in American corporate culture.”163 As long as prominent
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elites in the Republican coalition do not share Justice Scalia’s abhorrence of racial classifications,
a reasonable probability exists that Scalia’s views will not command a judicial majority, even if
Republicans are able to replace some of the more moderate members of the Roberts Court.
Republican activists who could not persuade Reagan and Bush I administration officials to
rescind executive orders mandating affirmative action164 are unlikely to be more successful
persuading such officials to nominate to the federal judiciary only those persons vehemently
opposed to any affirmative action program. Morever, devising judicial doctrine that does not
have loopholes may be exceptionally difficult. One wonders, for example, whether the Michigan
Law admissions process at issue in Grutter would have generated different outcomes had decision
makers not been required to consider race as an element of diversity, but could simply have used
their own best judgment. Similarly, as long as major businesses perceive the economic value of
having a workforce that racially and ethnically resembles the markets they serve, a high
probability exists that judicial decisions outlawing any form of racial preference will simply drive
such practices further underground.165
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Conservatives may have more success transforming conservative judicial victories into
significant conservative policy outcomes when they litigate property rights. Conventional
wisdom among scholars and litigators is that such cases as Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission166 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council167 are significantly restraining land
use and environmental regulation, though not necessarily for reasons that appear on the face of the
majority opinions in those decisions. Supreme Court decisions providing what may seem fairly
minor legal protections for property holders often substantially increase the litigation costs
localities must pay to maintain even regulations that federal courts would probably declare
constitutional. J. Peter Byrne notes, “(e)ven when local governments successfully defend against
takings lawsuits, the mere cost of litigating these claims can be staggering.”168 Not surprisingly,
many local officials prefer settlement when their zoning or environment rules are legally
challenged. The consequence is probably substantial underregulation.169 Affluent Americans are
particularly likely to benefit from judicial decisions that require local governments passing land
use and environmental regulations to meet vague constitutional standards. “Although the
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increased litigation costs may favor the government over small property owners who do not have
the resources to maintain a costly lawsuit,” Barton Thompson notes, “the increased expense
concomitantly may favor large property owners over the government."170
Susan MacManus and Patricia Turner’s 1992 survey of municipal law officers provides
generalized support for claims that local governments refrain from enforcing constitutional land
use and environmental regulations in order to avoid litigating takings lawsuits. Their findings
confirmed that one major cause of the sharp rise in litigation costs municipalities experienced
during the early 1990s was “an explosion in the non-tradition use of civil rights statutes . . . to
include cases involve such areas as zoning and land development.”171 Poorer municipalities
reported that defending environmental regulations was eating away at the local budget.172 Local
officials responded to this litigation crisis primarily by foregoing projects they thought
constitutional. MacManus and Turner found that “81.4[of all officers surveyed] acknowledged
they settled at least some of their ‘winnable’ cases just to save money.”173 Some jurisdictions
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settled “over half their cases to save money.”174
These conservative litigation successes paradoxically suggest that more conservative
judicial decisions in regulatory cases may have diminishing public policy returns. Preliminary
evidence indicates that official decisions to enforce regulations are as much based on comparative
ability to pay litigation costs as beliefs about whether the regulation at issue will survive judicial
scrutiny.175 If this is correct, property holders with the capacity to litigate need only a
constitutional standard strong enough to avoid having their lawsuit dismissed on a motion for
summary judgment in order to secure a favorable settlement with local officials. By comparison,
government officials need only a constitutional standard weak enough to prevent summary
judgment for the property holder in order to forestall litigation by those without the resources to
engage in protracted litigation.
The admittedly sketchy evidence on the different impacts conservative judicial decisions
have had on affirmative action and regulatory policy highlight the important role willingness and
ability to litigate play in American constitutional politics.176 Various tiers of judicial scrutiny may
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have more influence on legal theory than on political practice. Mere rationality tests have
significant policy consequences when, as seems to be the case with environmental and land use
law, an apparently deferential legal standard nevertheless enables private parties to avoid
summary judgment, thus increasing the litigation costs fiscally weak localities must pay to
maintain both constitutional and unconstitutional policies. Strict scrutiny may have a lesser
policy impact when, as seems to be the case with affirmative action, local officials are willing to
pay substantial litigation costs to maintain putatively unconstitutional policies and are able to
impose substantial litigation costs on parties seeking to challenge their actions. These differences
in willingness and capacity to litigate help explain and supplement Rosenberg’s conclusion that
“courts may effectively produce significant social reform when other actors impose social costs to
induce compliance.”177 When conservative litigants are able to impose more litigation costs than
liberal officials are willing to pay, the resulting public policy is likely to be more conservative
than mandated by the Supreme Court. When liberal officials are willing to pay litigation costs
and are able to impose more litigation costs than potential conservative litigants are willing to
pay, public policy is likely to be more liberal than mandated by the Supreme Court.

IV. Conclusion

A. Whither the Roberts Court
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Progressives at present should be more worried about radicals in suits than radicals in
robes.178 The conservative Republicans who presently control all elected branches of the national
government are adopting programs that most progressives believe transfer wealth from the poor to
the best off Americans, degrade an already degraded environment, weaken national capacity to
form crucial alliances in the war against terrorism, foster unconscious and conscious bigotry on
the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation, favor drug companies over the
medically needy, and largely give government over to large investors.179 The Roberts Court is
likely to contribute to this conservative agenda, if at all, only at the margins. If country-club
conservatives continue influencing the judicial selection process, the Supreme Court in the future
may strike down particularly egregious (and one suspects largely symbolic) restrictions on
abortion and homosexuality.180 If libertarians continue influencing the judicial selection process,
certain national environmental laws will be declared unconstitutional.181 These decisions will
have some impact, particularly if they can be enforced by market mechanisms or impose more
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litigation costs than liberal administrators are willing to pay.182 Still, when seen in political
context, worrying about the impact of a conservative Supreme Court in a conservative era is a bit
like our worrying about whether global warming will increase the flooding in our basement.
Progressives probably will not have to worry about the impact of the Roberts Court should
the political left in the near future established relatively enduring control over the national
legislative, national executive, and most state governments. Throughout American history,
dominant national coalitions have consistently triumphed over recalcitrant courts. Justices when
faced with hostile elected officials frequently pull their punches. The Marshall Court began by
refusing to challenge the Jeffersonian decision to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801183 and ended by
finding ways to avoid a direct challenge to Jacksonian policies toward the Cherokee Indians.184
Governing officials have ignored justices who have or are likely to declare cherished policies
unconstitutional. President Abraham Lincoln refused to obey a writ of habeas corpus issued by
Chief Justice Roger Taney.185 Members of his cabinet and military officers for the next four
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years transferred prisoners or refrained from appealing adverse lower court rulings in order to
avoid a Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of martial law.186 Other judicial
challenges to popular policies are soon reversed. The Chase Court’s challenge to the
constitutionality of legal tender lasted one year.187 The Hughes Court’s challenge to the New
Deal lasted two years.188 When all else fails, jurisdiction may be curtailed. Congress, by
repealing the Judiciary Act of 1866, prevented the Supreme Court from declaring unconstitutional
crucial reconstruction measures.189 Jurisdiction was restored shortly after several Republican
appointees replaced Democratic holdovers.190 Courts in other countries that too aggressively
challenged a dominant national coalition were completely reconstituted.191
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Conservative courts may be more than a small irritant when progressives first gain control
of all national elected institutions. Progressives who come to power while the Roberts Court sits
will likely be forced to spend scarce political resources combating judicial hostility to their
national agenda. The consequence will likely be that their “majority coalition [will be] diverted
from its program of substantive policies to a quarrel, often inspiring internal disunity, about issues
of constitutional structure and organization.” This “division in both the electoral and the
governmental wings of the majority party over the counterattack on the judiciary,” David
Adamany points out, “diminishes the [progressive] coalition’s ability to act in concert on other
matters.”192 Roosevelt’s court-packing plan cost his administration crucial political support and
time, and may have been partly responsible for the conservative surge in the 1938 midterm
elections.193 Nevertheless, progressive problems with conservative courts played only a minor
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role in the waning of the New Deal.194 Both history and scholarship suggest that to the extent
progressives successfully establish a durable electoral majority, their long-run concern is more
likely to be staffing a court that best serves those progressive values than combating a court that
does not.195
Conservative courts are likely to influence public policy significantly only after
progressives secure partial control of the national government. Divided government throughout
the world facilitates judicial policymaking. “The more diffused politics are,” Tom Ginsburg
observes, “the more space courts have in which to operate.”196 When the national executive and
national legislature are controlled by two very different majorities, courts that support legislative
constitutional commitments, executive constitutional commitments, a combination of both, or a
middle way, can be confident that at least one major national institution will come to their defense
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should the national branch controlled by judicial losers attack. Ginsburg details how judicial
activism flourished in Taiwan, South Korea, and Mongolia when government was divided.197
The same is true in the United States. Much Warren Court activism was rooted in the sectional
divisions that divided the dominant Democratic party, divisions that encouraged liberal executives
to promote liberal judicial policymaking when they could not always rely on liberal legislative
policymaking.198 Much Burger Court activism was a consequence of liberal legislators and
conservative executives turning to courts to resolve their policy and constitutional disputes.199
The Roberts Court may prove to be quite destructive to progressive interests during a time
of divided government. A conservative court is likely to side with conservatives when disputes
arise between elected institutions controlled by conservatives and elected institutions controlled
by liberals. The Roberts Court augmented by one more conservative appointee is highly likely to
interpret narrowly or declare unconstitutional progressive legislation intended to reign in a
conservative president’s efforts to engage in unilateral policymaking and rights violations during
the war against terrorism. The same justices might also insist on approval from a conservative
congress should a progressive president seek to abolish the military ban on gay soldiers or
mandate by executive order that affirmative action be practiced in the federal workplace.
Most important, conservative courts are likely to be able to do more damage to liberal
regulatory reforms than liberal courts can do to conservative regulatory reforms. For the most
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part, conservatives promote deregulation. Courts contribute to those efforts even when they
announce fairly weak standards for protecting property rights, because financially strapped
localities often cannot afford to pay the litigation costs necessary for maintaining constitutional
regulations. Progressive regulatory reform, by comparison, typically requires the wellcoordinated efforts between multiple actors that is very difficult to achieve in a regime where
power is diffused as widely as in the United States.200 To the extent that courts merely add to the
complexity and expense of that coordination, they are likely to inhibit significantly progressive
efforts to improve the environment, promote national health care, and redistribute economic
resources. In short, good reasons exist for thinking that Roberts Court decisions during a time of
divided government will do more to prevent liberal policymaking than Warren and Burger Court
decisions during a time of divided government did to promote liberal policymaking.

B. Drifting Toward Libertarianism

The Roberts Court in almost every conceivable political environment is likely to make
American public policy more libertarian. Independent judicial capacity to limit government will
be relatively minimal should the present conservative ascendancy endure or be replaced by a
durable progressive majority. The Roberts Court will have a far greater impact during periods of
divided government by siding with the more conservative branch of the national government
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against the more progressive branch when the latter seeks to promote government power to
redistribute wealth, provide universal health care, promote greater social equality, and heal the
environment.201 This judicial libertarianism is partly rooted in distinctive features of
contemporary constitutional conservatism. Republican elites consistently place higher legislative
priority on cutting taxes than banning abortion.202 The most prominent conservatives in the legal
academy, Richard Epstein and Randy Barnett, write bold arguments for judicial activism on
behalf of libertarianism and have little affinity for religious communitarianism.203 Contemporary
liberals exhibit similar tendencies. Democratic elites fight to death to prevent any law regulating
abortion, but typically cave on welfare issues.204 Other causes of judicial libertarianism, however,
are more rooted in American constitutional practice and more global aspects of judicial review.
Courts, American courts in particular, tend to push policy in more libertarian directions for
three reasons. First, the Constitution of the United States has historically been understood to
consist of enumerated powers and limits on government power. The Constitution, most judges
and scholars believe, "is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties."205 This common
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characterization of the constitution explains why both conservatives and liberals have emphasized
constitutional arguments against government regulation rather than constitutional arguments
mandating government action. Liberals during the 1960s and 1970s gained more judicial support
when they asserted the constitution forbade government regulation of abortion than when they
asserted that the constitution mandated that the poor be supplied with certain basic necessities.206
Conservatives have more plausibly asserted that the constitution forbids government regulation of
campaign finance than that the constitution mandates protection of unborn children.207 Second,
the affluent, well educated citizens who tend to become justices are more concerned with freedom
from government regulation than government protection. Ran Hirschl observes how judges
throughout the world typically are allied with secular elites who promote libertarian agendas.
Their decisions protect more marginalized citizens only when doing so is “congruent with the
prevalent conceptualization of rights as safeguards against state interference with the private
sphere.”208 The country club Republicans who cast crucial votes on the Rehnquist Court were far
more concerned with limiting environmental regulations than prohibiting abortion.209 Their more
liberal counterparts were far more committed to a constitutional right to sexual autonomy than
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constitutional rights to basic necessities.210 Third, judicial decisions prohibiting government
action consistently have had more policy impact than judicial decisions requiring government
action. Courts have proven poor vehicles for requiring schools to integrate or adopt color-blind
policies. By increasing litigation costs and allowing private markets to function more freely,
however, judicial decisions have more successfully protected property holders from land-use
regulations and increased middle class access to safe abortions.
The legitimacy of judicial review rests on what courts do in practice rather than on what
they do in theory. Whether justices are more likely than other officials to interpret the
constitution correctly is contestable,211 but accumulating evidence is demonstrating that judicial
review has predictable policy consequences. Courts have powerful tendencies, particularly when
government is divided, to impede government action, liberal or conservative, good or bad.
Progressives who should not worry much about the role of conservative courts in a conservative
era ought to worry a good deal about whether courts in general are more inclined and able to

210

Compare Lawrence v. Texas with M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 125 (1996) (refusing

to challenge cases “recognizing that the Constitution ‘generally confer[s] no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property
interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.’ DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 . . . (1989)”).
211

See Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,” 115 Yale Law

Journal 1346, 1376-86 (2006); Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, pp. 5471, 152-53.

64

promote the deregulatory projects generally preferred by the political right to the regulatory
projects generally preferred by the political left.

